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PROPERTY
"persons" to which section 1983 applies." Yet, in the face of
these trends, the doctrine of judicial immunity has held fast.
The most solid conclusion to be drawn from Sparkman v.
Stump is that regardless of the degree of injury resulting from
judicial conduct, the judiciary will continue to immunize its
brethren with a generous hand,
ANN BOWE
PROPERTY-Subject to Financing Clause-Escalator
Provision in Mortgage Commitment Fails to Satisfy Specif-
icity Requirement in Offer to Purchase. Woodland Realty,
Inc. v. Winzenried, 82 Wis. 2d 218, 262 N.W.2d 106 (1978).
"It would seem to behoove brokers, attorneys and parties to
avoid such clauses as they would a plague."' As illustrated by
a recent Wisconsin Supreme Court decision, Woodland Realty,
Inc. v. Winzenried,2 this recommendation concerning subject
to financing clauses3 has proven to be accurate. The clause in
the offer to purchase real estate has been fertile ground for
litigation. Changes have been suggested and made, but often
to little avail. A brief overview of these changes will demon-
strate the types of problems encountered, and the clause used
in Woodland and in other recent cases will be examined. These
clauses have developed as a result of court suggested changes.
Yet Woodland demonstrates the continuing difficulties faced
by parties who negotiate real estate agreements which are
made subject to buyer obtaining financing. This article dis-
cusses some of these problems and suggests alternatives to the
subject to financing clause. Finally, a sample clause is drafted
as one possible response to Woodland.
Several early Wisconsin cases4 dealing with the clause illus-
63. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 46 U.S.L.W. 4569 (1978).
1. Aiken, "Subject to Financing" Clauses in Interim Contracts for Sale of Realty,
43 MARQ. L. Rav. 265, 300 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Aiken].
2. 82 Wis. 2d 218, 262 N.W.2d 106 (1978).
3. Subject to financing clauses will hereinafter be referred to simply as "clauses."
4. See Kenner v. Edward Realty & Fin., 204 Wis. 575, 236 N.W. 597 (1931), wherein
the financing clause merely stated that buyer agreed to financing in a specified amount
pursuant to loan negotiations with a third party lender. See also Kovarik v. Vesely, 3
Wis. 2d 573, 89 N.W.2d 279 (1958), wherein the financing clause stated, "This offer is
contingent upon buyer's ability to arrange above described financing." Id. at 575, 89
N.W.2d at 281.
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trate that the financing condition was given little attention.
The issue in litigation invariably concerned the Statute of
Frauds and whether a vague clause made the entire contract
void. Then, in "Subject to Financing" Clauses in Interim Con-
tracts for Sale of Realty, "I the author discussed in detail not
only the Statute of Frauds problem but also how such clauses,
if not definite and certain, could effect the making of the con-
tract itself. The possibility that the clause would be interpreted
as a condition precedent, or that such vague clauses would
cause the contract to be found illusory for want of mutuality
of consideration, was also considered.' The publication of this
article seems to have marked a turning point in judicial atti-
tudes about the clause.7
The first decision dealing with the issue thereafter was
Gerruth Realty Co. v. Pire.5 In that case defendant submitted
an offer to purchase subject to financing. In determining that
the financing clause was a condition precedent to the perform-
ance of the contract, the court stated that only after the condi-
tions were definite enough to be interpreted would the issue of
buyer's good faith be raised. Since the Gerruth contingency
was found to be too vague, the good faith issue was not reached.
Then, in Krause v. Holand,9 the court held that clauses con-
taining no details would make the entire contract void for in-
definiteness.
The Wisconsin Real Estate Examining Board, authorized
by statute to adopt rules and write approved forms for real
5. Aiken, supra note 1.
6. Aiken, supra note 1, at 266-70. The author suggested the following inclusions:
amount of loan needed, term, amortization rate, interest, type of loan, escrow provi-
sions, who is to procure loan, and amount of time to procure, whether terms must be
"satisfactory" or "reasonable" to buyer, and consequences if lender withdraws after
tentative commitment.
7. A second article, Raushenbush, Problems and Practices with Financing Condi-
tions in Real Estate Purchase Contracts, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 566 [hereinafter cited as
Raushenbush], reported the results of a survey of brokers and attorneys conducted to
determine custom and usage in the area. The author found that terms such as "subject
to financing" were often used without further detail. Id. at 570.
8. 17 Wis. 2d 89, 115 N.W.2d 557 (1962). The financing clause stated, "This offer
to purchase is further contingent upon the purchaser obtaining the proper amount of
financing." Id. at 90, 115 N.W.2d at 558. See also Boulevard Builders, Inc. v. Snyder,
13 Wis. 2d 486, 108 N.W.2d 914 (1961); Annot., 81 A.L.R.2d 1338 (1962); 46 MARQ. L.
Rav. 388 (1962-1963). Cf. Long Inv. Co. v. O'Donnell, 3 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N.W.2d 674
(1958).
9. 33 Wis. 2d 211, 147 N.W.2d 333 (1967). The financing clause stated, "Subject
to securing a loan by 8/31/64. Otherwise downpayment will be refunded. O.K. Ivar
Holand." Id. at 213, 147 N.W.2d at 334.
[Vol. 62:123
PROPERTY
estate brokers,' reacted to this litigation. In Wisconsin Real
Estate Law, the board stated that brokers should detail the
financing needed by buyer. The manual sets out this suggested
form:
A mortgage in the amount of Fifteen Thousand Dollars
($15,000) at not to exceed 8% interest per annum on the un-
paid balance, monthly payments (including interest, princi-
pal, taxes and insurance) not to exceed $250.00 for a term of
not less than 15 years."
In two recent cases' 2 this advice was followed and, while the
clauses in question were far more sophisticated than any before
Gerruth, they were nevertheless subject to successful challenge
for lack of definiteness.
For example, judging the financing clause in Lien v. Pitts13
against the one suggested in Wisconsin Real Estate Law, the
latter should have been an "adequately detailed financing con-
dition." However, the Lien trial judge's decision on motions
after verdict suggests that difficulties will be encountered in
the interpretation of even such well-drafted contingency
clauses. The judge raised two questions of interpretation, one
dealing with the definition of a conventional loan and one con-
cerning the scope of the amortization clause."4
In remanding for a new trial, the supreme court suggested
procedures to be followed in interpreting such financing
clauses:
"If the court is to have a manageable task, and at the
same time respect what the parties intended, it must not
construe financing conditions to give too broad a discretion
to buyer, 5 for that is not what the parties intend. Nor must
it attempt to write details into financing conditions that have
10. Wis. STAT. § 227.014 (1975).
11. WISCONSmI REAL ESTATE LAW § 5.05(b), at 5-12 (1976).
12. Woodland Realty v. Winzenried, 82 Wis. 2d 218, 262 N.W.2d 106 (1978); Lien
v. Pitts, 46 Wis. 2d 35, 174 N.W.2d 462 (1970).
13. 46 Wis. 2d 35, 174 N.W.2d 462 (1970). The financing clause in Lien stated:
"This offer is contingent upon the buyer, or O'Malley Realty Company, in the
buyer's behalf, obtaining a first mortgage loan commitment in the amount
$29,000 (Twenty-nine thousand dollars) with interest not to exceed 7 'A % (seven
and one quarter) percent per annum and for a term not to exceed 25 (twenty-
five) years. Buyer agrees to cooperate fully in fulfilling the above contin-
gency. ...
Id. at 37-38, 174 N.W.2d at 464.
14. Id. at 42, 174 N.W.2d at 466.
15. But see Aiken, supra note 1, at 283.
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almost no detail. . . .[Ilt should be ready to throw out
badly drafted or vague contracts as void for indefiniteness,
following the Gerruth Case. . . For contracts which do con-
tain adequately detailed financing conditions, the court must
somehow judge the materiality of the details and the good
faith of the buyer, hard as that task is. .. .
Woodland, the second decision by the court in this area,
demonstrates that both the trial judge's questions and the su-
preme court's suggestions in Lien merit further attention.
Woodland
Roy and Carole Winzenried signed an exclusive listing con-
tract with Woodland Realty, Inc. The realtor obtained from
Howard and Mary Knight a written offer to purchase which
contained the following clause:
"This offer is contingent upon buyer, or Stefaniak Realty,
Inc. for buyer, obtaining a first mortgage loan commitment
for $25,700.00, with interest not to exceed 81 % per annum
and for a term of not less than 30 years, and monthly pay-
ments for a principal and interest, not to exceed $193.09 plus
1/12 of estimated annual real estate taxes and 1/12 of annual
insurance premium. Buyers agree to co-operate fully in ful-
filling the above contingency." '' 7
The Winzenrieds accepted the offer; buyers applied for and
received a mortgage commitment from Guaranty Savings and
Loan for $25,700 at 81/% interest. One month later, buyers
advised the Winzenrieds and their broker that they regarded
the offer as null and void because an escalation clause in the
loan commitment would allow the lender to increase the loan
interest rate.
Woodland Realty brought suit against the Winzenrieds,
claiming to have procured a buyer and seeking the agreed upon
commission. The Winzenrieds impleaded the Knights as third
party defendants. Finding that Woodland Realty had not pro-
cured a purchaser, the trial court dismissed the action. Wood-
land brought this appeal. The sole issue presented to the su-
preme court, then, was whether Woodland Realty had in fact
procured a purchaser. Citing Wauwatosa Realty Co. v. Paar,'8
16. 46 Wis. 2d at 44-45, 174 N.W.2d at 467 (footnote added) (quoting Raushenbush,
supra note 6, at 621).
17. 82 Wis. 2d at 221, 262 N.W.2d at 107-08.
18. 274 Wis. 7, 79 N.W.2d 125 (1956).
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the court stated that under a listing contract, the broker's com-
mission becomes due when a "valid and enforceable contract"1'
is signed. The court then examined the offer to purchase to
determine its enforceability, focusing on the contingency
clause.
The clause was held to be a condition precedent operating
"to delay 'the enforceability of the contract until the condition
precedent has taken place;' "20 the issue then became whether
the escalation clause requirement caused the financing condi-
tion to fail. Citing Williston, 21 the court restated the general
rule that "a condition precedent must be 'exactly fulfilled or
no liability can arise on the promise which such condition qual-
ifies.' ",22 While recognizing that slight deviations might be per-
mitted, the court held that any such deviations could not be a
material part of the condition.2 This reasoning led to the con-
clusion that the escalation clause was such a material term;
therefore, no valid and enforceable contract had been made.
Suprisingly, there was no mention in Woodland of Lien v.
Pitts24 in which the court had constructed a framework to aid
in the interpretation of subject to financing clauses. Instead,
the Woodland court relied on its 1958 decision in Kovarik v.
Vesely,21 in which the clause in question was virtually void of
details. Concerned with the problem of mutuality of obligation,
Kovarik cited Long Investment Co. v. O'Donnell2 as the rule
to be followed in such cases. In Long Investment, appellant-
seller contended that a contract for the sale of realty would be
void for lack of mutuality if buyer had a unilateral right to
cancel based on a condition in the contract. Citing Corbin,2 the
Long Investment court stated that when a condition is outside
a party's control, as is true with a subject to financing clause,
there is no problem of want of consideration, and therefore the
contract is valid.2
The Woodland court then found that, although the contract
was not void for want of consideration, the condition precedent
19. 82 Wis. 2d at 223, 262 N.W.2d at 108.
20. Id.
21. 5 S. WILLISTON, LAW OF CoNmcTRs § 675, at 184 (3d ed. 1961).
22. 82 Wis. 2d at 224, 262 N.W.2d at 109.
23. Id. The court relied on Kovarik v. Vesely, 3 Wis. 2d 573, 89 N.W.2d 279 (1958).
24. 46 Wis. 2d 35, 174 N.W.2d 462 (1970).
25. 3 Wis. 2d 573, 89 N.W.2d 279 (1958).
26. 3 Wis. 2d 291, 88 N.W.2d 674 (1958).
27. 1A A. CORBIN, CORBrN ON CONTRACTS § 163, at 76 (2d ed. 1963).
28. 3 Wis. 2d at 296, 88 N.W.2d at 676.
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had not been fulfilled and therefore the buyer's duty had not
arisen under the conract. Since buyers were not obligated, the
broker was not entitled to his commission.
Yet another line of interpretation could have been followed
by the Woodland court-one more in line with Lien v. Pitts,
in which the court stated that too much discretion should not
be given to buyer. The Woodland court might have reasoned
that since buyers had not bargained to include nor exclude an
escalation clause, the terms of their loan commitment matched
the terms of the financing for which they had bargained in the
offer. Kenner v. Edwards Realty & Finance Co. 9 would support
this holding:
It seems unreasonable to assume that an independent con-
tract, the terms of which must have been considered and
which was to be finally executed by appellant [buyer] to run
to a third party [mortgagee], and then under the agreement
appellant's obligations as fixed by the third party and itself
were to be assumed by the respondents [seller] . ...
Other jurisdictions have used this line of interpretation. For
example, a California buyer sought release from his contractual
obligation because his mortgage commitment contained a pre-
payment penalty.31 The court stated that buyer had placed no
such restriction on obtaining the loan; therefore, he was not
entitled to reject the loan because of its inclusion. In a New
Hampshire case,3" buyer sought to recover his earnest money by
claiming he had refused financing since the loan terms in-
cluded an escalation clause and a prepayment penalty. In its
decision on the reasonableness of the conditions, the court took
into account the mortgage money market existing at the time
of the loan and determined that, in light of those conditions,
the financing terms were reasonable.n
In contrast, the Woodland court, after finding the escala-
tion clause to be a material element, did not look at the reason-
ableness of the deviation. The court did seek to limit its opinion
by stating that, "We do not . . . hold that all deviations are
material. '34 Those drafting an offer to purchase are therefore
29. 204 Wis. 575, 236 N.W. 597 (1931).
30. Id. at 582, 236 N.W. at 600.
31. Fry v. George Elkins Co., 162 Cal. App. 2d 256, 327 P.2d 905 (1958).
32. Gaynes v. Allen, 116 N.H. 469, 362 A.2d 197 (1976). See also Annot., 78
A.L.R.3d 880 (1977).
33. 116 N.H. at -. , 362 A.2d at 198-99.
34. 82 Wis. 2d at 224, 262 N.W.2d at 109.
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left with the question of precisely what will be considered as
material a deviation in the subject to financing contingency as
the escalation clause.
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Perhaps the most widely used form for offers to purchase is
the one suggested in Wisconsin Real Estate Law.35 The broker
for Woodland Realty improved on this form by identifying the
party who was to obtain the financing and by adding the
phrase, "'Buyers agree to co-operate fully in fulfilling the
above contingency.' "3 Obviously, since this clause was not
sufficient, the form found in Wisconsin Real Estate Law must
be abandoned.
Other suggested standard form clauses which receive some
use are found in legal forms texts such as Nichols' Cyclopedia
of Legal Forms7 and American Jurisprudence Legal Forms
2d. 31 None of these, however, survives the Woodland test, since
no mention is made of an escalation clause and the interest rate
is set out exactly as in Woodland. In both books, the forms
specify that receipt of the loan commitment is conclusive proof
of fulfillment of the condition, yet such receipt was found not
to be conclusive in Woodland.
35. See note 10 supra.
36. 82 Wis. 2d at 221, 262 N.W.2d at 108.
37. 8 C. NICHOLS, CYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL FORMS § 8.1149b, at 638-39 (rev. ed. 1973).
Three forms are set out; all three suggest similar elements. "B" is used as an illustra-
tion:
This agreement is contingent upon purchaser obtaining a mortgage commit-
ment in the amount of $_ amortized over a period of - years with interest
rate not more than % per annum and mortgage commission not more than
-%, subject only to purchaser's credit rating. If said mortgage commitment
cannot be obtained by purchaser or by - as purchaser's agent within -
days from date hereof, then at the option of either party hereto, this agreement
shall become null and void and earnest money will be returned to purchaser in
full.
38. 16 Am. JuR. LEGAL FORMS 2d § 219.339, at 154-55 (1973) (emphasis in original).
Purchaser shall undertake forthwith to secure, in good faith, a commitment
for a - [mortgage or deed of trust] on the subject real property from a
lending institution, in the net amount of not less than - Dollars ($-), after
payment of all expenses, points, and charges; and shall continue to seek such
loan diligently.
The terms of the loan and the expenses thereof shall not be less favorable to
purchaser than the following: annual interest rate: - per cent ( 5%); total
amortization: - years; monthly payment of principal and interest: - Dol-
lars ($-); - points; other expenses - Dollars ($-).
This contract is subject to and conditioned on purchaser's obtaining a com-
mitment for such loan on such terms, or better, on or before _, 19- ....
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One clause which may survive the Woodland test is found
in Real Estate Practice39 and includes the words "initial inter-
est." This language might survive a Woodland test since buyers
did receive an initial interest rate of 81/4%. The word "initial"
provides for inclusion of an escalator.
However, even if the word "initial," or a term such as
"[t]his loan commitment may include an escalation clause,"
is added, one must still be concerned with the possibility that
other financing terms will be considered material. In light of
Woodland, one must judge what is as material a term as the
escalation clause. Woodland cross-referenced Kovarik as an-
other test - that of deciding whether a term is as material as
the phrase, "time is of the essence." Neither is very definitive.
Perhaps more precise is the standard suggested in the trial
court's memorandum decision in Woodland.4 The trial judge
agreed with the contention of buyer's attorney that the escala-
tion clause was material because escalation of the interest rate
would have an economic impact on buyer's financing. If this is
an accurate indicator, the drafter must be concerned with any
terms and requirements which might have an economic impact
on the buyer.
For purposes of illustration, assume that buyer seeks a con-
ventional first mortgage loan to purchase a single family resi-
dence. She/he will be required to sign a mortgage and mortgage
note; it is the mortgage note which defines the terms of financ-
ing and which contains the escalation clause, if one is included.
Under the simplest standard mortgage note,4' mortgagor prom-
39. M. Greenberg, Real Estate Practice 5-6 (unpublished lmanuscript) (on file in
the office of Marquette Law Review) (emphasis added).
Procurement by Buyer or Broker on behalf of Buyer from a responsible
lending institution of a first mortgage loan in an amount not less than $_ with
initial interest not to exceed .- % amortizable in equal monthly installments
of principal and interest in an amount not to exceed $._.._ (exclusive of any
amount required to be escrowed for real estate taxes and insurance) for a term
of - years with a loan fee not to exceed 9...._% of the amount of the loan and
lender's closing costs exclusive of the loan fee not to exceed $_...,
If Buyer shall furnish Seller with a written financing commitment from his
lender within 14 days from the date of acceptance of this offer, or waive in
writing this condition within said period, Buyer's obligation shall be deemed
satisfied. Otherwise, this offer shall be null and void and all earnest money paid
hereunder shall be returned forthwith to Buyer.
40. Woodland Realty v. Winzenried, No. 426-878 (Milwaukee County Cir. Ct. Feb.
1976).
41. H.C. Miller Co., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, Standard Mortgage Note, form S.L.
135 (6/76).
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ises and agrees to some twenty separate provisions. Which of
these must seller and seller's agent be concerned with when
accepting an offer subject to a financing clause? If the test
suggested above is an accurate indicator, any terms having an
economic impact on the financing must be considered. The list
would include: the escalation clause, the prepayment penalty,
any escrow requirement with respect to insurance and taxes,
the late charge provision, any due-on-sale or due-on-
encumbrance clauses and possibly the mortgagor's agreement
to a six month foreclosure in the event of default. Seller may
also need to consider closing costs and points charged as part
of buyer's loan cost, since these too have obvious economic
impact. This list could grow if the buyer sought financing other
than by conventional loan.
Complications abound. Contract language in the standard
form offer to purchase,4 2 the same as used by the broker in
Woodland and as approved by the Wisconsin Real Estate Ex-
amining Board, may also be too ambiguous. As the broker's
attorney in Woodland pointed out, the language immediately
following the subject to financing clause in the standard form
says, "Buyer agrees that unless otherwise specified, he will pay
all costs of securing any financing to the extent permitted by
law, and to perform all acts necessary to expedite such financ-
ing.''43 An escalation clause could be interpreted as a cost of
financing, particularly since it is regulated by law.44 However,
since the court has stated that the financing contingency is a
condition precedent which must be exactly fulfilled before any
liability can arise on the promise it qualifies, the duty of buyer
to pay costs of financing will not arise if the condition prece-
dent is not exactly fulfilled. Therefore, if the quoted language
is to have any effect, it must become part of the condition
precedent rather than the body of the contract. As it now
stands, buyer's duty to pay all costs of financing can arise only
if a condition - getting financing - occurs. This promise,
contained in the body of the contract, becomes the same unful-
filled condition in the financing clause. Since Woodland, buyer
may be able to claim that the condition precedent is not ful-
42. Wisconsin Legal Blank Co., Inc., Milwaukee, Wisconsin, form WB-1C, "Offer
to Purchase - with acceptance," (revised 1-19-77).
43. Id. lines 27, 28.
44. Wis. STAT. § 138.053 (1975). (This section regulates interest adjustment provi-
sions for an owner-occupied residential property of not more than four units.)
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filled because of financing costs required by lender which were
not provided for in the subject to financing clause. While seller
can point to the contract language, claiming buyer has a duty
to pay all costs of financing, buyer may claim that any addi-
tional costs not specified in the condition are not the financing
bargained for. The condition therefore remains unfulfilled and
the duty under the contract never arises. Clearly, this circular
argument creates a loophole for buyer.
GOOD FAITH
At this point, many questions have been raised and few
answered. However, before making any suggestions, the issue
of good faith will be considered. Using the Lien v. Pitts" frame-
work, if the clause in question is not vague, the court must
judge the materiality of the details and the good faith of the
buyer. Since the Woodland court did not find the financing
condition vague, it should then have judged materiality and
good faith under the Lien test. However, once the court in
Woodland concluded that the escalation clause was a material
element, it never considered good faith. Woodland therefore
changed the Lien test. A court must now not only find that a
clause is not vague, but also that none of the material elements
is missing, before good faith becomes an issue.
As discussed above, the court has held that a contract has
mutuality of obligations as long as the condition in question is
out of the parties' control. While the Woodland court reasoned
that obtaining financing was not a condition in buyer's control,
buyer did receive the loan commitment and thereafter could
have selected one of many requirements to remove her/himself
from the contractual obligation. While the court was correct in
stating that the lender's decision to give financing is out of
buyer's control, this would not be true after a loan commitment
is obtained. Once buyer has received the commitment and
states that the financing terms are not acceptable, the reasona-
bleness of that statement and the good faith of buyer should
be at issue. The decision to accept the financing terms is, after
all, not outside buyer's control. A good faith test at this point
would be consistent with the good faith required when buyer
makes efforts to procure a loan."
45. 46 Wis. 2d at 44-45, 174 N.W.2d at 467.
46. See, e.g., Weaver v. Fairbanks, 10 Wash. App. 688, 519 P.2d 1403 (1974) (a
decision which made the same comparison between the good faith effort to procure and
[Vol. 62:123
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Financing is complicated, and lenders require buyer to
make many promises. Because of these many requirements, the
Woodland buyers found a release from their contract. Corbin
pointed out that: "The greater the number of alternatives that
by the terms of the promise are left open to the promisor, the
less is the limitation upon his own future will; but the promise
still remains a sufficient consideration. It remains so until the
limitation becomes non-existent, or, it may be, practically neg-
ligible. 47 If buyer's conditional promise is not to be illusory,
theremust be some limitation on buyer's right to refuse financ-
ing once a loan commitment is made. A requirement of good
faith would be such a limitation.
Other jurisdictions have attempted to resolve some of these
issues by looking to the reasonableness of the financing. In an
Illinois case,48 buyer had turned down financing after having
received a loan commitment as in Woodland. However, the
contingency in Smith revolved around purchaser's "ability" to
secure a mortgage. The Illinois court stated that buyer must
demonstrate that the terms of financing were not reasonable
and further stated that, "[Tihis requirement of reasonable-
ness is not a subjective standard to be applied to a sole buyer.
Rather, reasonableness is to be determined and interpreted by
the court according to business practice and custom in the
place where the contract is to be performed." 9
Yasuna v. National Capital Corp.5" also involved lender's
requirements in real estate contracts. In Yasuna, a contract to
procure a financing commitment between a broker and his
principal was at issue; the case parallels Woodland in that the
principal claimed that the financing procured was not that
bargained for since the loan commitment required progress
fees. The Maryland court looked to intent and surrounding
circumstances and concluded that, "[Tihe inclusion of such
charges in the commitment was predictable, since they are
rather commonplace in financing transactions ....- 11
There is a limitation to this approach, as the court pointed
out in Gerruth Realty. In order to draw inferences from current
the good faith obligation to fulfill a condition precedent).
47. 1A A. CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 160, at 62 (2d ed. 1963).
48. Smith v. Vernon, 6 Ill. App. 3d 434, 286 N.E.2d 99 (1972).
49. Id. at 437, 286 N.E.2d at 102 (emphasis added).
50. 273 Md. 617, 331 A.2d 49 (1975).
51. Id. at _ 331 A.2d at 54.
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practices with respect to financing, evidence must show that
the "parties contracted knowingly and in the light of any cur-
rent practices in the community .... 5,52 Therefore, even if
good faith and custom and usage are considered by the Wiscon-
sin court, the burden of proof will still be a heavy one. A con-
tract without contingencies should therefore be considered as
an attractive alternative.
OUT OF THE Woodland
Since "[t]he varieties of nonconformity between contract
and offered financing which might be imagined are innumera-
ble, ' 53 the use of an option contract,5 in which buyer pays
consideration to seller to keep an offer open for a stated period,
should be considered in place of a subject to financing clause.
No conditions are involved. If buyer is able to obtain financing,
a second purchase contract would then be entered into, again
with no conditions. It would behoove sophisticated real estate
investors and developers to use option contracts. Yet after
many years of difficulties, the offer subject to a financing con-
dition continues to be used. While this may be due to igno-
rance, vested interests of the agent or mere habit, other factors
may be involved as well. One is the uncertainty of financing
itself and the growing expense of applying for a loan. Added to
this is the fact that unsophisticated parties in home sale trans-
actions are frequently unaware of the strength of their credit
rating.
While it can be argued that, by taking the property off the
market, seller gives something for nothing when accepting an
offer with a financing contingency,5 buyer's efforts and expen-
ses in attempting to procure financing might properly be con-
sidered sufficient consideration. 5 It is not surprising that buyer
prefers not to risk losing the earnest money paid at the time of
the offer, since he has already expended a substantial sum for
the loan application.
Seller on the other hand, wants to know when the contract
52. 17 Wis. 2d at 94, 115 N.W.2d at 560.
53. Aiken, supra note 1, at 285.
54. Id. at 300.
55. Id.
56. M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACTS AND CONVEYANCES OF REAL PROPERTY § 1.5, at 95-96
(3d ed. 1975). See also White & Bollard, Inc. v. Goodenow, 48 Wash. 2d 180, 361 P.2d
571 (1961). A buyer can expect to spend in excess of two hundred dollars to procure a
loan. If buyer's application is rejected, the process and payments must begin again.
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with buyer is enforceable-that is, when the house has been
sold. Prior to Woodland, seller considered the house sold when
buyer obtained a loan commitment. However, Woodland indi-
cated that the loan commitment was not enough. Therefore, if
parties are to continue to offer and accept a contract subject
to a financing condition, changes should be made in that condi-
tion.
An attempt could be made to draft a clause which would
provide for all expenses and promises buyer might be required
to meet. Such a laundry list approach is always risky. Another
approach might be to attach a form of the mortgage note to the
offer, with buyer agreeing to accept all its provisions; 57 how-
ever, there are problems connected to this procedure as well.
For example, in municipalities requiring occupancy permits
when a change of residency occurs, some lenders require buyer
to secure the permit." To secure this permit, structural repairs
might be necessary. Since these repairs are not required by the
mortgage note, attaching the note to the offer would be una-
vailing. Additionally, with variable rate mortgages on the rise,
the standard mortgage note is becoming a thing of the past.
Another suggestion would require a change in the business
practices of lenders. If a prepurchase loan approval were avail-
able, the need for a financing condition in the offer would be
avoided. At this time, however, lenders require an accepted
offer before allowing buyer to make a loan application, and
there is probably little chance that this custom will change.
As stated earlier, the option is currently the safest way for
seller to contract when buyer is unsure of financing. Since a
contract without conditions is the one most preferred by seller,
seller should either bargain for an unconditional promise or use
the option. Buyer, on the other hand, should bargain for a
contract with a subject to financing clause. Obviously, compro-
mise is in order. An offer with a clause to protect buyer in the
event financing is not obtained, but requiring a waiver of the
condition otherwise, is suggested. Once a loan commitment is
obtained by buyer, seller would receive a waiver of the condi-
tion signed by buyer;-9 in effect, seller then has a contract with-
57. Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 251, 263 (1958): "It seems obvious that if the contract
includes a complete mortgage form, it cannot be considered incomplete."
58. Municipalities in Milwaukee Metropolitan area which presently require occu-
pancy permits include Cudahy, Fox Point, Mequon and Brown Deer.
59. Signed, formal waiver should be required. See Robert F. Felte, Inc. v. White,
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out the contingency.
Even if such a clause is to be part of the offer, parties must
still be concerned with making the contract language definite
and certain. The clause should give such details as: amount of
loan needed, initial interest rate required, terms of the loan,
amount required for escrow for taxes and insurance, who is to
procure the loan, kind of lender, type of loan sought, loan fee
and amount of time buyer is given to procure the loan. The
conditional language should also require that buyer submit
both the loan commitment and a signed waiver of the condition
to seller or seller's agent. The language could also state that
failure to sign a waiver of the condition makes the contract null
and void. It is to seller's advantage to keep the time given to
buyer relatively short and to make this time of the essence. The
writer suggests the following clause:
This contract is subject to buyer or broker on buyer's be-
half obtaining a loan commitment from a reputable lending
institution on or before - for a conventional " first mort-
gage loan against the subject property only6' in the amount
of at least $-, with an initial interest"2 rate of not more
than _% per annum, for a term of not less than - years
amortizable in initial monthly payments of principal and in-
terest not to exceed $_ (exclusive of any amount required
to be escrowed for real estate taxes and insurance), with a
loan fee not to exceed _% of the loan amount and any
other lender's closing costs not to exceed $__.
If said financing is obtained, buyer agrees to furnish seller
with a written loan commitment and an executed written
waiver"' of this financing contingency within 14 days of the
451 Pa. 137, 302 A.2d 347 (1973) (wherein the court stated that if contract language is
unambiguous, waiver must also be unambiguous).
60. If other kinds of loans are to be sought, such as V.A., F.H.A., F.N.M.A.,
F.H.L.M.C., etc., the offer should so state. If buyer is asking for a particular kind of
loan, seller should be most careful in getting a waiver once the loan is granted since
state and federal agencies have various requirements which could complicate the prob-
lems already discussed.
61. By specifying that buyer need only use the property being sold as security, this
language excludes the possibility that buyer could be forced to accept financing with
additional security requirements. If buyer intends to bargain with additional proper-
ties used as loan security to obtain financing, this should be clearly specified in the
clause.
62. Words "initial interest" added in direct response to Woodland. See note 35
supra.
63. By requiring the waiver, that part of the clause stating, "Buyer agrees that
unless otherwise specified he will pay all costs of securing any financing," is given full
effect. Buyer will no longer be able to look to the condition precedent as an excuse
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acceptance of this offer, or seller may, exercised by written
notice to buyer, declare this offer null and void and forthwith
return all deposits to buyer.
As this article illustrates, no magic words will make a fi-
nancing clause free of all doubt. While this suggested clause
attempts to include all "material elements" which could have
an economic impact on the financing buyer is to procure and
adds the word "initial" in specific response to Woodland, its
strength rests in seller procuring an executed written waiver64
of the condition. Without the waiver, the issue of whether the
condition was fulfilled will still be present.
To summarize, the Woodland case reillustrates the prob-
lems that arise in drafting an offer to purchase subject to a
financing condition. Financing is dynamic and complicated
and for that reason makes a contract subject to a financing
condition subject to the same complications. Whenever possi-
ble, financing conditions should be avoided. When this is not
possible, the party in whose favor the condition was made
should be required to sign a waiver once the condition has been
fulfilled.
PATRICIA D. JURSIK
TAXATION - Tax Free Transfers of Property to Corpora-
tions - Transferor in Control of Corporation Despite Di-
rect Issuance of Stock to Third Party. D'Angelo Associates,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978). In the recent deci-
sion of D'Angelo Associates, Inc. v. Commissioners,' the Tax
Court invalidated yet another transfer scheme designed to
avoid section 351 of the Internal Revenue Code which provides
for the nonrecognition of gain on the contribution of property
to a corporation by its owners. In doing so the court treated a
taxpayer who sold some of his assets to a corporation as an
owner of the corporation even though he never owned any of the
corporation's stock.
should he/she fail to fulfull this requirement. See note 39 supra.
64. Goebel v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 83 Wis. 2d 668, 266 N.W.2d 352 (1978).
Provisions included for the benefit of a party may be waived.
1. 70 T.C. 121 (1978).
1978]
